NTSB Audio: 3 AM Vegas Flight Ends in Fatal Go-Around Accident

The Cessna Citation 550 was almost home.

It had departed Las Vegas in the early morning darkness and was returning to French Valley Airport in Southern California.

The flight had been uneventful.

Then the weather changed.

Only minutes before the aircraft's arrival, French Valley went from relatively good visibility to a low overcast and fog.

The crew attempted an instrument approach.

They missed.

Then they asked for another approach.

On the second attempt, the aircraft descended toward Runway 18.

The crew continued below the approach's decision altitude without the required visual references.

At approximately 4:14 a.m. on July 8, 2023, Cessna 550 N819KR struck terrain about 810 feet short of the runway threshold.

Both pilots and all four passengers were killed.

The NTSB classified the accident as an altitude deviation and determined that the circumstances were consistent with controlled flight into terrain. (NTSB Data)

The Overnight Flight

N819KR had begun its journey at French Valley Airport.

The aircraft departed around 9:18 p.m. for Harry Reid International Airport in Las Vegas.

It arrived in Las Vegas approximately 10:04 p.m.

Several hours later, around 3:16 a.m., the Citation departed Las Vegas for the return flight.

The airplane climbed to approximately 19,000 feet.

The return flight initially appeared routine.

The crew was operating under instrument flight rules.

The aircraft was equipped for instrument approaches.

But the weather at the destination was changing rapidly.

The Weather Deteriorates

When the flight was still some distance from French Valley, weather conditions at the airport were significantly better.

Visibility had been approximately 10 statute miles.

Then the weather deteriorated.

The ceiling dropped to about 300 feet.

Visibility fell to approximately three-quarters of a mile.

Over the following 20 minutes, visibility decreased further to approximately one-half mile because of fog. (NTSB Data)

That change was critical.

The RNAV GPS Runway 18 approach had a minimum visibility requirement of seven-eighths of a mile.

The weather had deteriorated below that minimum.

The airport was becoming unsuitable for the approach.

The crew now had to decide whether to continue, divert or wait for conditions to improve.

Canceling IFR

Earlier in the flight, the crew had canceled its IFR clearance while still north of French Valley.

The controller advised the pilot that VFR altitude and routing were at his discretion and that the controller did not have current weather or landing information for French Valley.

A short time later, after receiving updated weather, the pilot asked to be picked up again for an IFR approach.

The crew was now committed to returning to the airport under instrument conditions.

The decision was understandable from a destination-management perspective.

But the weather had continued deteriorating.

The First Approach

The aircraft was cleared for the RNAV GPS Runway 18 approach.

The approach became unstable.

That decision was appropriate.

If the runway environment is not visible at the required point, the approach must be discontinued.

The crew then requested another attempt.

The controller cleared them for another instrument approach.

The airplane turned back toward French Valley.

This time, the situation became more dangerous.

The Second Approach

During the second approach, the aircraft was descending at an excessive rate.

Its airspeed was also higher than desired.

The NTSB found that the approach was not stabilized.

The aircraft continued descending.

The crew reached the decision altitude.

But the required visual references had not been established.

The airplane should have executed another missed approach.

Instead, it continued downward.

But the aircraft was already too low.

The Final Seconds

The Citation descended below the decision altitude.

The terrain rose beneath it.

The impact destroyed the airplane.

The two pilots and four passengers died.

The final approach had placed the aircraft extremely close to the runway, which may have created the psychological impression that the landing was almost complete.

But the runway was still not visible.

The aircraft was still below the safe altitude.

That is the fundamental danger of continuing an approach after reaching the missed-approach point.

No Mechanical Failure

Investigators examined the aircraft and engines.

They found no evidence of mechanical failures or malfunctions that would have prevented normal operation. (NTSB Data)

The engines were functioning.

The aircraft was capable of flying the approach.

The accident therefore did not result from an engine failure, flight-control malfunction or loss of aircraft power.

It was an approach-control accident.

The airplane descended below the safe altitude while the required visual references were absent.

The Pressure of Getting Home

The flight had begun late at night.

The return leg departed Las Vegas around 3:16 a.m.

Fatigue was therefore an important contextual factor.

The crew had already completed a flight to Las Vegas, spent time there and then departed for the return journey during the early morning hours.

The destination was familiar.

And the first approach had already been missed.

These factors can create subtle pressure to complete the second approach.

A missed approach feels like a failure of the first attempt.

A second attempt can feel like the opportunity to "finish the job."

But the second approach should be treated as an entirely new decision.

If the weather remains below minimums, the answer remains the same.

Go around.

Controlled Flight Into Terrain

Controlled flight into terrain is particularly dangerous because the aircraft remains flyable until impact.

There may be no obvious mechanical emergency.

The engines continue running.

The controls work.

The instruments work.

The pilots are still able to maneuver.

Yet the aircraft's flight path intersects the ground.

That is exactly what happened to N819KR.

The airplane did not fall out of the sky.

It was flown into terrain while the crew was attempting to complete an instrument approach.

NTSB Probable Cause

"The flight crew's decision to descend below the decision altitude without the required visual references and with visibility below the prescribed minimums, resulting in controlled flight into terrain."

The Board also considered the rapidly deteriorating weather conditions and the crew's decision-making during the second approach. (NTSB Data)

The final report emphasizes that the aircraft was mechanically capable of normal flight.

The central failure was maintaining the safe approach profile.

Accident Facts

The NTSB factual and final reports provide ADS-B information, ATC communications, weather data and the reconstruction of both approaches. (NTSB Data)

The Human-Factors Lesson

The most important lesson is that a missed approach is not a failed landing.

It is a successful safety decision.

The first approach demonstrated that the weather was difficult.

The second approach should therefore have been treated with even greater caution.

The fact that the runway was only hundreds of feet away did not make the approach safer.

It made the temptation to continue stronger.

This is why instrument approach procedures are built around hard limits.

The decision altitude exists because below that altitude, the aircraft no longer has enough guaranteed terrain clearance if the runway environment cannot be seen.

The missed approach point is not a suggestion.

It is a safety barrier.

Six people died.

The broader aviation lesson is clear:

When the runway is not visible at minimums, the safest approach is the one that never reaches the runway.

Sources

• Original ATC recording