IL-76 Slams Into Another IL-76 on Landing — 4 Crew Members killed — (2009)

Two enormous Ilyushin Il-76 transport aircraft were operating at Makhachkala Airport in Russia on January 15, 2009.

One was already on the ground.

The other was landing.

The weather was poor.

Visibility was limited.

And the aircraft waiting near the runway was positioned in a place where the arriving Il-76 could not safely pass.

Then the landing aircraft touched down.

Its wing struck the cockpit of the Il-76 waiting near the runway.

The impact destroyed the forward portion of the stationary aircraft.

A fire erupted.

Four crew members aboard the stationary Il-76 were killed.

The landing aircraft survived with damage, and none of its 31 occupants were injured. (Wikipedia)

The accident became one of the most striking examples of how runway and taxiway positioning can create a fatal conflict even when both aircraft are enormous and highly visible.

Four Il-76s on a Military Mission

The aircraft belonged to the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs.

Four Il-76 transport aircraft had departed Chkalovsky air base carrying personnel and equipment for a mission to Makhachkala.

The aircraft were operating as part of a coordinated movement.

The first aircraft landed successfully.

The second aircraft, RA-76825, landed afterward.

It unloaded its personnel and equipment.

Then it taxied toward a runway access point and waited for another Il-76 to land.

It was approaching Makhachkala under difficult weather conditions. (Wikipedia)

The airport had a single runway.

That made runway occupancy and position awareness especially important.

There was no second parallel runway that could provide a simple separation solution.

The Weather

The weather was close to the airport's established minimum conditions.

Reports described fog, runway visibility of approximately 800 meters and vertical visibility of about 60 meters. (Wikipedia)

Those conditions dramatically reduced the ability of crews to see other aircraft from the cockpit.

The arriving Il-76 was therefore relying heavily on instruments and radio information during the approach.

The aircraft waiting near the runway also needed to maintain precise awareness of its position.

In reduced visibility, a position that might appear obviously safe in daylight can become much more difficult to assess.

RA-76825 Moves Into Position

After landing and unloading, RA-76825 taxied toward the runway access point.

The aircraft crossed the end line of a taxiway.

But the crew did not report its exact position to air traffic control. (Wikipedia)

That became critical.

The arriving RA-76827 was approaching the same runway.

The tower therefore needed an accurate picture of where the aircraft already on the ground was located.

Without that precise position report, the separation picture was incomplete.

This was not simply a question of seeing the aircraft.

The landing crew could not necessarily see the stationary aircraft through the fog.

The controller needed reliable position information.

The Landing

RA-76827 approached the runway.

The weather was close to minimums.

The aircraft touched down approximately 15–20 meters left of the runway centerline.

It was now moving along the runway while RA-76825 was positioned near the runway access area.

The two aircraft converged.

The impact was catastrophic for the stationary aircraft.

Its cockpit was destroyed.

A fire erupted.

The forward fuselage suffered massive damage.

The arriving aircraft sustained wing damage but remained intact enough for its occupants to survive. (Vie Publique)

Four Crew Members Killed

RA-76825 had seven crew members aboard.

Four were killed.

Three survived, although two suffered injuries.

The four fatalities were members of the aircraft's flight crew.

The accident therefore struck the people who were waiting aboard an aircraft that was not moving.

None of the 31 occupants of RA-76827 were injured. (Wikipedia)

That contrast is striking.

The landing aircraft had significant kinetic energy at the moment of collision.

But the point of impact was the cockpit of the stationary aircraft.

The crew sitting there had almost no opportunity to react.

Why the Accident Happened

The accident was fundamentally a problem of surface position awareness and separation.

The crew did not adequately communicate its position.

The landing aircraft approached under poor visibility.

The arriving aircraft also touched down left of the runway centerline.

The combined circumstances created the collision geometry.

The accident is therefore an important example of how runway incursions and surface conflicts do not always involve a small aircraft crossing a runway in front of an airliner.

And in poor visibility, the size of the aircraft does not guarantee that crews will see one another in time.

A Single-Runway Airport

Makhachkala's runway configuration increased the importance of precise coordination.

The airport had a single runway approximately 2,648 meters long and 70 meters wide. (Vie Publique)

When an airport has one runway, aircraft operating on or near that runway must be carefully sequenced.

An aircraft waiting near the runway can become a hazard even when it is technically not occupying the centerline.

Large aircraft have substantial wingspans.

A wingtip can extend far beyond the portion of pavement that pilots intuitively consider the runway.

That is why runway-entry and holding-position procedures exist.

The aircraft must be positioned so that an arriving or departing aircraft has sufficient clearance.

The Role of ATC

The accident also demonstrates the limits of ATC when position information is incomplete.

A controller can only build a reliable traffic picture from the information available.

If an aircraft moves into a new position without reporting it, the controller's mental model can become outdated.

In good visibility, a controller may still be able to resolve the problem visually or through surface surveillance.

In fog, that safety net is greatly reduced.

The aircraft waiting on the ground therefore needed to be especially precise about its position.

The arrival needed to know whether the runway environment was clear.

The controller needed accurate information from both.

The failure of those layers allowed the conflict to develop.

The Fire

The impact caused a fire that severely damaged RA-76825.

The aircraft's cockpit was destroyed.

The fire added another hazard for the surviving crew members.

Emergency responders had to reach the aircraft while dealing with burning fuel and structural damage.

The event closed the airport while the damaged aircraft and debris were removed.

The material damage was later estimated at approximately 158.7 million rubles. (Wikipedia)

RA-76827 was subsequently repaired and returned to service in December 2010.

RA-76825 was written off.

Investigation Findings

The accident investigation identified pilot error involving the aircraft waiting on the ground as a major factor.

The sequence was straightforward:

RA-76825 landed.

It unloaded.

It moved across the taxiway-end line.

Its position was not adequately reported.

RA-76827 approached in poor visibility.

RA-76827 touched down slightly left of the runway centerline.

A fire followed.

Four crew members died.

The French aviation safety report on the accident likewise describes the landing Il-76 striking the cockpit of the aircraft preparing to depart, followed by a fire and multiple fatalities. (Vie Publique)

Why the Cockpit Was Vulnerable

The geometry of the collision mattered.

The cockpit was therefore directly exposed to the structural impact.

The aircraft waiting near the runway could not simply move out of the way at the final moment.

A large Il-76 does not turn or accelerate like a small aircraft.

Its crew also had limited visibility in the fog.

The accident demonstrates why holding positions are not suggestions.

They exist because large aircraft need substantial clearance.

Accident Facts

Aviation Safety Network independently cross-references the two aircraft and records the accident as the January 15, 2009 Makhachkala Il-76 collision. (Wikipedia)

The Human-Factors Problem

The most important lesson is not simply "don't park an aircraft near a runway."

The deeper problem is the failure to maintain a shared mental model.

The controller needed to know where RA-76825 was.

The crew of RA-76827 needed to know whether the runway environment was clear.

The crew of RA-76825 needed to know that their position created a potential conflict.

When everyone has the same picture, the system is relatively robust.

When one person has a different picture, the system becomes vulnerable.

In Makhachkala, the arriving aircraft was operating in extremely poor visibility.

The aircraft waiting on the ground had moved beyond the taxiway area.

And the controller did not have the same precise position awareness that would have been necessary to prevent the collision.

Why Readbacks and Position Reports Matter

Position reports are sometimes treated as routine radio chatter.

They are not.

They are safety information.

A position report tells everyone else where an aircraft is and what it intends to do.

In a complex airport environment, that information allows controllers and other crews to build a shared traffic picture.

When visibility is poor, the importance increases.

An aircraft that cannot be seen must effectively be located through its radio position and surveillance information.

If that information is wrong or missing, another aircraft may unknowingly enter the same area.

The Broader Safety Lesson

The Makhachkala collision shows that surface safety is not simply an airport-design problem.

It is a human coordination problem.

A huge aircraft can become a hazard simply by being in the wrong place at the wrong time.

Fog removes visual confirmation.

Military operations can involve multiple aircraft moving in sequence.

And large aircraft require substantial clearance.

The accident also demonstrates why pilots must never assume that ATC "knows where they are."

If an aircraft changes position, the crew must ensure that ATC's picture remains accurate.

Similarly, controllers must be alert to situations in which an aircraft's reported position and actual position may differ.

At Makhachkala, two Il-76s came together on the same runway environment.

One was landing.

One was waiting.

The impact destroyed the cockpit of the waiting aircraft and killed four crew members.

The tragedy was not caused by a failure of the aircraft's engines or flight controls.

It was caused by something far more basic:

two crews and the ground-control system did not maintain the same picture of where the aircraft were.

In aviation, that gap can be measured in meters.

The consequences can be measured in lives.

Sources

• Original ATC recording