Flirting on the Job: Was Controller Negligence Behind the Hudson Midair？

The probable cause therefore involved multiple factors rather than a single mistake: the inherent limitations of see-and-avoid and the controller's nonpertinent telephone conversation. The investigation also produced safety recommendations concerning the Hudson corridor, traffic separation, ATC procedures and electronic traffic advisory systems.

That distraction mattered operationally because the controller failed to correct the airplane pilot's readback of the Newark tower frequency and did not complete the communication transfer to Newark in a timely manner. The NTSB also identified deficiencies involving traffic-awareness information and procedures in the Hudson River special flight rules environment.

The investigation found that the airplane pilot did not see the helicopter until the final seconds, illustrating the limitations of visual see-and-avoid in the busy Hudson corridor. The report also found that the Teterboro local controller was distracted by a nonpertinent telephone conversation while performing ATC duties.

The NTSB investigation examined more than the final seconds before impact. Investigators considered the limitations of the see-and-avoid concept, the information available to the pilots, the transfer of communications between Teterboro and Newark and the actions of the local controller responsible for the airplane's traffic.

At 11:53:14 a.m. EDT on August 8, 2009, Piper PA-32R-300 N71MC and Eurocopter AS350BA N401LH collided over the Hudson River near Hoboken, New Jersey. The airplane carried three people and the helicopter carried six. Everyone aboard both aircraft was killed.

The Hudson River Midair Collision and the ATC Failures Investigators Found

The NTSB's completed investigation also led to safety recommendations affecting the Hudson River corridor. Those recommendations addressed procedures for the special flight rules area, vertical separation, the see-and-avoid concept and electronic traffic advisory systems. The recommendations show that investigators treated the collision as a broader operational and system-safety problem rather than as a single pilot error.

The investigation's significance lies in the interaction of those factors. A visual lookout system has inherent limitations when aircraft operate close together, but the NTSB also found that information and communication systems were not being used as effectively as they could have been. The controller's distraction was therefore one element in a chain that began before the final sighting of the helicopter.

Accident Facts

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