Fatal Crash During Emergency Second Landing Attempt

Timeline

Event 1 —

The Challenger 605 approached Truckee-Tahoe Airport for the first landing attempt.

1.

Event 2 —

The crew discontinued the first approach after the approach became unsuitable.

2.

Event 3 —

The crew requested another approach as conditions and the wind continued to present difficulties.

3.

Event 4 —

The aircraft entered the second approach and maneuvered toward the runway environment.

4.

Event 5 —

The flight path deteriorated during the final portion of the second approach.

5.

Event 6 —

The aircraft descended into terrain near the airport and was destroyed.

6.

Fatal Crash During Desperate Second Landing Attempt

The warning had already been given.

The wind at Aspen-Pitkin County Airport was gusting strongly across the runway, and the Challenger crew had just abandoned their first approach after encountering a powerful tailwind. They knew the conditions were difficult.

Yet minutes later, the same aircraft was back on approach.

This time, the landing would not be completed.

At about 12:22 p.m. on January 5, 2014, a Bombardier Challenger 601-3R, registration N115WF, crashed while attempting to land on Runway 15 at Aspen-Pitkin County Airport in Colorado. The aircraft briefly touched the runway, bounced, and then descended violently back toward the pavement. One of the three people aboard was killed and the other two suffered serious injuries. The aircraft was destroyed. (NTSB Data)

The accident happened during the aircraft's second landing attempt.

The first approach had already demonstrated that the wind was a serious threat. During that first approach, the crew reported a 33-knot tailwind and executed a missed approach. Instead of abandoning the landing altogether, they requested vectors to try again. (NTSB Data)

The second attempt would put the crew into even greater difficulty.

The NTSB investigation eventually determined that the crew failed to maintain control during an unstabilized landing. Investigators also identified two critical contributing factors: the decision to land with a tailwind above the airplane's operating limitations and the failure to execute a go-around once the approach became unstable. (NTSB Data)

What makes the accident particularly important is that the airplane was not simply caught by an unexpected mechanical failure.

And another option—going around—remained available.

A Corporate Jet Bound for Aspen

N115WF was a Bombardier Challenger 601-3R, a twin-engine business jet manufactured in 1994.

The aircraft was registered to the Bank of Utah Trustee and operated by Vineland Corporation Company of Panama. The January 5 flight originated at Tucson International Airport, Arizona, at approximately 10:04 a.m. The destination was Aspen-Pitkin County Airport, commonly identified by its airport code ASE. (NTSB Data)

There were three people aboard.

Two were flight crew members, while the third occupant was a pilot-rated passenger.

The difficulty began as the Challenger approached Aspen.

Aspen is not an ordinary airport for a large business jet. Its elevation is approximately 7,838 feet above sea level, the runway is surrounded by mountainous terrain, and the airport's single runway creates additional operational constraints.

Approaches therefore demand careful preparation.

Wind conditions are particularly important because the runway orientation can produce substantial tailwind or crosswind components.

On this afternoon, those winds were becoming the central problem.

The First Approach

As N115WF approached Aspen, air traffic control vectored the aircraft toward the LOC/DME-E approach to Runway 15.

The local controller provided the crew with the latest wind information.

The wind was from approximately 290 degrees at 19 knots, gusting to 25 knots.

That meant the aircraft would be landing with a significant tailwind component.

Then something changed.

The airplane encountered a much stronger tailwind than expected.

This was a major warning.

The crew had not merely heard about a strong wind.

They had experienced it while attempting to land.

The first approach had therefore provided direct evidence that conditions were unfavorable.

The aircraft climbed away from the airport.

They could leave Aspen.

They could wait.

They chose the second option.

Asking for Another Approach

After completing the missed-approach procedure, the Challenger contacted Aspen Approach.

ATC accommodated the request and vectored N115WF back toward the localizer for another LOC/DME-E approach.

The aircraft was now preparing for its second attempt to land.

The decision was not automatically unreasonable. A missed approach does not mean an airport can never be attempted again. Weather and wind conditions can change quickly, and pilots are permitted to reassess the situation.

The second attempt therefore required particularly conservative decision-making.

The crew needed to ensure that the actual wind remained within the airplane's landing limitations.

They also needed to maintain a stabilized approach.

If either condition could not be achieved, another go-around was the obvious escape route.

The Wind Gets Worse

At approximately 12:21 p.m., the Aspen controller provided the latest wind information.

The wind was now from 330 degrees at 16 knots, with a one-minute average from 320 degrees at 14 knots and gusts to 25 knots.

The crew acknowledged the information.

Runway 15 points roughly southeast, meaning winds from the northwest produced a tailwind component.

The NTSB's later analysis determined that the wind conditions were near or beyond the Challenger's published operating limitations for tailwind and crosswind during landing. (Flight Safety Foundation)

This was not simply a matter of a few knots of wind.

The airplane was being asked to land under conditions that materially reduced the safety margin.

The Approach Initially Looks Normal

The second approach did not immediately look like a disaster.

According to the NTSB's investigation, the initial portion of the approach was consistent with the expected descent profile.

The aircraft's flap configuration and spoiler use were also initially appropriate.

For a moment, the approach appeared to be developing normally. (NTSB Data)

But the final minute told a very different story.

The engines were advanced and retarded repeatedly.

Investigators later determined that the engines were adjusted five times during the final minute.

At the same time, airspeed varied between approximately 135 and 150 knots.

Those fluctuations were a warning that the aircraft was not maintaining the stable energy state expected during a normal final approach. (YouTube)

The airplane was approaching a runway at high altitude, in gusty wind, with a significant tailwind.

The margin for correcting a deteriorating approach was getting smaller.

The "Go Around" Call

The final moments were captured by the airport's ATC recording.

The controller suddenly transmitted:

"Go around, go around, go around, go around."

The instruction came too late.

The Challenger had already reached the runway environment.

The NTSB's factual report records the repeated go-around instruction at approximately 12:22:04, immediately followed by the accident. (NTSB Data)

But it did not make a normal landing.

It bounced.

The airplane then became airborne again and descended rapidly toward the runway.

Airport surveillance video later provided investigators with a second perspective. The video showed the aircraft's engines being advanced just before the first runway contact, followed by the bounce and another hard descent. (Aspen Journalism)

The vertical acceleration associated with the final impact was approximately 6 G.

The Crash

One wing separated.

A post-impact fire developed.

Emergency crews responded immediately.

The three people aboard were injured, but the severity of their injuries varied considerably.

The copilot, Sergio Emilio Carranza Barbata, 54, was fatally injured.

The captain and the pilot-rated passenger survived but suffered serious injuries. (aspenpublicradio.org)

There were no reported fatalities on the ground.

The accident nevertheless closed Aspen's only runway and disrupted airport operations for approximately 36 hours while investigators examined and removed the wreckage. (aspenpublicradio.org)

The human cost was severe.

And the technical evidence would show that the crash was not the result of a single moment at touchdown.

The accident sequence had begun several minutes earlier.

Why the Second Approach Was So Dangerous

The second approach still had a substantial tailwind, with gusts reaching 25 knots.

The airplane was also approaching an airport where terrain limits the available options.

This combination should have produced an extremely conservative approach strategy.

Instead, the crew continued.

The Problem With "Salvaging" an Approach

A stabilized approach is built around maintaining predictable parameters.

The aircraft should be correctly configured.

Airspeed should be stable.

The descent rate should be controlled.

The airplane should be aligned with the runway.

Power changes should not be excessive.

If those parameters are not achieved by the required altitude, the approach should be abandoned.

N115WF violated that principle.

The engines were repeatedly adjusted.

Airspeed fluctuated.

The aircraft remained nose-down during its final descent and initial runway contact.

The airplane bounced and then became airborne again.

At that point, the safest option was not to attempt to save the landing.

It was to go around.

The aircraft had engines.

It had an escape path.

The NTSB's performance analysis later determined that, under several reasonable assumptions, the aircraft had sufficient performance capability to execute a go-around even at Aspen's challenging elevation and terrain environment. (NTSB Data)

The accident therefore was not simply an unavoidable consequence of being too low.

They did not successfully use it.

Experience and Familiarity

Both flight crewmembers had recently completed simulator training for the Challenger.

The captain reported only approximately 12 to 14 hours of total flight time in the aircraft type, including simulator time.

The copilot had a similar amount of experience. (YouTube)

That is a relatively small amount of experience in a complex business jet.

Under Part 135 rules, additional experience requirements would have applied before a pilot could act as pilot-in-command of such an aircraft.

But the accident flight was conducted under Part 91, so the specific 25-hour Part 135 requirement did not apply.

The NTSB nevertheless concluded that additional experience would likely have improved the crew's familiarity with the airplane, its limitations and the decision-making required during the approach. (Bureau of Aircraft Accidents Archives)

This distinction matters.

The crew was operating legally under the applicable rules for this particular flight.

But legal qualification and operational readiness are not always the same thing.

A Difficult Airport Demands More Margin

Aspen's environment magnified the consequences of a poor approach.

The airport sits at high elevation.

And a tailwind affects both groundspeed and landing performance.

A strong tailwind can increase the airplane's groundspeed for a given indicated airspeed. That means the aircraft travels over the ground faster during the final approach and landing.

It also increases the distance required to stop.

At Aspen, where the runway and surrounding terrain already impose operational constraints, this becomes particularly important.

The second approach therefore needed to be even more conservative.

Instead, the aircraft reached the runway in a configuration and energy state that the NTSB determined was unstable.

The ATC Perspective

The ATC audio provides an unusually clear timeline.

First, the controller provides the wind.

The aircraft climbs away.

ATC vectors them back.

The controller again reports the wind.

Then the aircraft enters the final phase.

Seconds later, the controller calls for a go-around.

The controller's repeated go-around instruction is important, but it should not be misunderstood.

The NTSB did not identify ATC as the primary cause of the accident.

The controller provided the wind information available at the time and issued a go-around instruction when the aircraft's situation became critical.

ATC could warn.

The Runway Contact

The NTSB's aircraft-performance investigation reconstructed the final seconds using flight-data-recorder information, radar data, airport video and other evidence.

The aircraft remained nose-down as it approached the runway.

It made an initial runway contact and bounced.

The airplane then climbed slightly before descending again.

The second impact was extremely violent.

The recorded acceleration reached approximately six times normal gravity.

The right wing separated, and the aircraft came to rest upside down before the post-impact fire developed. (YouTube)

The evidence was consistent with a loss of control during the landing rather than an engine failure or sudden structural failure.

Both engines were functioning.

What the NTSB Found

The NTSB spent more than three years investigating the crash.

The final investigation examined the flight-data recorder, cockpit voice recorder, weather, airport conditions, runway characteristics, aircraft performance, crew qualifications, training and ATC communications.

The investigation concluded that the airplane was capable of performing a go-around under the conditions examined.

That was important because it meant the crash was not simply caused by Aspen's high elevation or mountainous terrain. (NTSB Data)

The NTSB's Probable Cause

The official NTSB probable-cause statement reads:

“The flight crew's failure to maintain airplane control during landing following an unstabilized approach.”

— National Transportation Safety Board, CEN14FA099. (NTSB Data)

That finding captures the accident remarkably well.

The crew knowingly continued toward a landing with unfavorable wind conditions.

And the crew did not successfully discontinue it.

Accident Facts

The Human Cost

The technical details are important, but they should not obscure the people involved.

One of them, copilot Sergio Emilio Carranza Barbata, did not survive.

Contemporary reporting emphasized the seriousness of the crash and the difficulty of operating in Aspen's mountainous environment during strong winds.

It was the loss of a life during what should have been a routine business flight.

Why the First Missed Approach Matters

Perhaps the strongest lesson in this accident is contained in one fact:

They went around.

The problem was what happened next.

A second attempt can be perfectly reasonable when circumstances improve.

But there was no clear evidence that the fundamental problem—the wind—had disappeared.

The second approach still involved a significant tailwind and gusts.

At that point, the correct response was another go-around.

The accident therefore illustrates a dangerous psychological trap: the belief that a second attempt should succeed because the first one did not.

It is a safety maneuver.

The danger begins when pilots treat the go-around as something that must eventually be overcome rather than a legitimate outcome of an unsafe approach.

The Broader Aviation Safety Lesson

The Aspen Challenger accident is a powerful demonstration of how an otherwise flyable aircraft can become uncontrollable when pilots continue an approach beyond the point where it remains stabilized.

The crew went around.

But instead of treating the conditions as a reason to reconsider the destination, they requested another approach.

On the second attempt, the aircraft was again exposed to strong and gusty winds. The approach became increasingly unstable. Engine power changed repeatedly. Airspeed fluctuated. The airplane remained nose-down during the final descent.

The final warning came from the tower:

Go around.

But by then, the aircraft was already in the critical final seconds of the approach.

The Challenger touched down, bounced and slammed back onto the runway.

One pilot died.

The NTSB's findings show why the accident should not be reduced to "bad weather" or "pilot error." The weather was challenging, but the crew knew it was challenging. The aircraft had performance capability for a go-around. The decisive failure was allowing the approach to continue after it had become unstable. (NTSB Data)

The broader aviation lesson is straightforward:

A go-around is not giving up on a landing. It is choosing to preserve the airplane.

At Aspen, the first missed approach gave the crew an opportunity to step back and reassess. The second approach gave them another opportunity to discontinue the landing when the aircraft became unstable.

Both opportunities were available.

Only one was taken.

The accident ultimately demonstrates why stabilized-approach criteria, wind limitations, crew resource management and conservative decision-making matter so much—especially at high-altitude airports surrounded by terrain.

Sometimes the safest landing is the one you never attempt.

And sometimes the most important decision a crew can make is recognizing that a second attempt is not automatically better than the first.

Primary Source / Investigation Record

Investigation reference: CEN14FA099

Sources

• https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket?NTSBNumber=CEN14FA099