Emergency Second Landing Attempt Leads to Catastrophic Crash

Flight context

Flydubai Flight FZ981 arrived at Rostov-on-Don during severe weather in the early hours of 19 March 2016. The Boeing 737-800 had already completed a first approach before the crew discontinued the landing. More than an hour of holding followed. When the crew eventually began a second approach, the weather remained difficult and the aircraft was exposed to strong winds and windshear.

The final report did not describe a simple mechanical failure. The aircraft was serviceable. The critical sequence developed during the second go-around, when aircraft configuration, thrust application, control inputs and the captain's situational awareness interacted in a rapidly changing flightpath.

The critical sequence

The first approach had already provided a warning: the weather was not simply inconvenient. A windshear alert caused the crew to discontinue the landing despite having progressed deep into the approach. The decision to hold for conditions to improve kept the flight in a demanding environment for a prolonged period.

The second approach was also unstable. A wind gust produced a sharp airspeed increase near 1,000 ft, leading to another go-around. The final report identified the combination of the low aircraft weight, maximum available thrust and the go-around configuration as a factor in the large nose-up moment that developed.

Once the aircraft pitched sharply upward, the crew had to counter the resulting motion while the airplane's flightpath changed rapidly. The IAC concluded that the captain lost situational awareness during the nighttime IMC conditions. The first officer provided correct prompts, but the captain continued to control the aircraft and the required recovery was not achieved.

The report also considered psychological and organizational factors. It concluded that the captain was not psychologically prepared for a second go-around and may have been focused on completing the landing at Rostov. The report did not find a duty-time violation, but the long overnight operation and prolonged workload formed part of the context examined by investigators.

ATC decisions during the event

ATC was managing an airport affected by significant weather and multiple aircraft waiting for approaches. The FZ981 crew received weather information and approach clearances, but the actual windshear environment was changing. The key operational lesson is that an approach clearance does not make an approach safe; the crew must continuously evaluate whether the aircraft is stable and whether a go-around can be performed in the existing configuration and energy state.

Investigation and aftermath

The IAC's final report attributed the accident to incorrect aircraft configuration and incorrect crew piloting, followed by the captain's loss of situational awareness in nighttime instrument meteorological conditions. The report also identified the excessive nose-up movement generated during the go-around, the resulting control forces and the crew's uncoordinated response. Flydubai subsequently acknowledged and worked on recommendations covering training, HUD use, upset recovery, go-around callouts and psychological incapacitation procedures.

The report also makes clear that the first approach and the second approach should not be treated as identical events. The first go-around followed a predictive windshear warning, after which the crew climbed and remained in the area. By the second approach, the aircraft was again operating in a turbulent, nighttime environment and the crew was managing an unstable combination of speed, configuration and thrust. The IAC's recorded-data reconstruction is important because it shows the accident developing through measurable flight-control and energy changes rather than through a sudden unexplained aircraft failure.

What the record establishes

The IAC's reconstruction goes beyond describing the accident as a generic go-around upset. During the second go-around, the aircraft's configuration, thrust and pitch response created a rapidly changing control problem. The FDR recorded a simultaneous nose-down control-column input and nose-down stabilizer trim lasting 12 seconds. The aircraft climbed to about 1,000 metres and then entered a descent with approximately -1 g vertical acceleration. The crew's subsequent recovery inputs were insufficient before impact. The final report also addressed the crew's situational awareness, the nighttime IMC environment and the ambiguity surrounding go-around procedures.

What the sequence shows

FZ981 is important because it shows that a go-around is itself a maneuver that must be managed correctly. The first go-around did not cause the crash; it was the second attempt, after a prolonged hold and another unstable approach, that became catastrophic. The safety barrier is therefore not merely 'go around when unstable' but 'go around early, configure correctly, and be mentally prepared to abandon the landing completely.'

• Treat the first missed approach as a strong warning about the conditions.

• Do not allow destination pressure to turn a go-around into a rushed re-approach.

• Follow the correct configuration for the maneuver being performed.

• Use clear PF/PM coordination during windshear and go-around events.

• Maintain situational awareness throughout high-workload upset recovery.

Accident facts

Sources

• Original ATC recording