US Navy Seahawk Strikes Black Hawk During Night Training

The event in context

On November 22, 2022, about 1750 Pacific standard time, a Sikorsky UH-60A, N160AQ, and a US Navy Sikorsky MH-60R, 166583, sustained substantial damage when they were involved in an accident near San Diego, California. There were no injuries to the occupants of either helicopter. The UH-60 and the MH-60 were operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 training flights.

The PIC of the UH-60 reported that he and the second pilot were conducting night vision goggle training at Brown Field Municipal Airport (SDM) San Diego, California. The helicopter was located on the runway 26L underrun area. The PIC was on the flight controls and was preparing to takeoff.

The NTSB final investigation WPR23LA045 contains an unusually useful combination of evidence: complete Brown Field tower audio, ADS-B data, FAA radar data, ATC interviews and photographs. The two helicopters were conducting nighttime training near the non-movement portion of Runway 26L, known as the underrun.

Reconstructing this flight

He heard the tower controller state, “I need you on the go, copter 129.” After departing, and while between 200 to 500 ft above ground level (agl) the PIC saw another helicopter fly over as it appeared in his left-side upper window. He lowered the collective, put in right cyclic, and then felt the contact along with noise and vibrations. He made a mayday call and landed to the area between the runways.

After the landing he directed the other pilot to perform an emergency shutdown. The PIC of the MH-60 reported that they were on approach to the airport and the SDM tower controller issued them a clearance, stating, “Number 2 following the aircraft on short final for runway 26L underrun, cleared for the option.” After turning to the final approach leg, and aligning with runway 26L, the tower controller directed the MH-60 pilots to, “Go around the north side of 26L.” While over the first half of the runway, the PIC felt the other helicopter impact them on the aft-bottom portion of their helicopter and saw debris fly up under the rotor arc. The pilot then landed on runway 26L.

The UH-60 sustained damage to the four main rotor blades at the tips, damage to one tail rotor blade, and damage to the vertical stabilizer. The MH-60 sustained damage to the left side of the stabilator. Both helicopters were recovered to secure facilities for further examination.

The first helicopter, a UH-60A, was preparing to depart. The second, an MH-60R, was approaching and was instructed to go around north of Runway 26L. The NTSB found that the second helicopter’s crew failed to maintain visual separation while complying with the go-around instruction. The Board also identified nighttime conditions and the absence of a controller safety alert as contributing factors.

What the evidence establishes

That finding makes this a particularly valuable ATC case. The controller’s instruction was not itself enough to guarantee separation. The pilots still had to maintain visual awareness of the other helicopter, while the controller had another opportunity to issue a specific traffic alert when the paths converged.

How the Two Helicopter Paths Converged

The reconstructed sequence can be read as a chain of six decision points: UH-60 training / departure → MH-60R approach → Go-around instruction → Paths converge → Rotor/airframe contact → Both helicopters land. Each step changed the aircraft’s available options. The important analytical point is not to isolate the final impact from the preceding events; the final outcome was produced by the accumulation of the earlier changes in aircraft state, position, workload and available escape options.

The ATC/radar perspective is most useful when it is synchronized with the aircraft evidence. In this case the critical transition is the move from uh-60 training / departure to both helicopters land. Once the aircraft reached the later stages of the sequence, the crew had fewer safe alternatives than they had at the beginning. That is the operational value of reconstructing the event rather than describing it only from the final crash scene.

The Collision-Risk Chain

The decisive safety issue in this incident was specific to the sequence: MH-60R approach; Go-around instruction; Paths converge. Treating those events as isolated anomalies would miss the way they interacted.

Sources and investigation material

• https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-repgen/api/Aviation/ReportMain/GenerateNewestReport/106354/pdf
• https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket?ProjectID=106354

Accident Facts