Pilot and Wife Killed After a Confusing Night IFR Approach

The controller had already issued a low-altitude warning.

The airplane was approaching Raleigh-Durham International Airport at night.

The pilot had struggled with the GPS, the autopilot, headings and approach instructions. He had been told to climb. He had been vectored back toward the approach.

Now, on final, the controller warned him again.

The pilot said he had the runway in sight.

Shortly afterward, radar contact disappeared.

The Piper PA-32 crashed into the dark, wooded terrain of William B. Umstead State Park, just over a mile from the runway.

Two people aboard were killed.

The NTSB concluded that the pilot failed to maintain a safe glidepath during the final approach. The Board identified his lack of recent instrument experience as a contributing factor.

A flight that became increasingly difficult

The accident occurred on October 20, 2019.

The Piper PA-32, registered N534Z, was flying toward Raleigh-Durham International Airport.

At approximately 6:25 p.m., the pilot checked in with RDU North Departure Radar at 5,000 feet and requested the RNAV GPS runway 5R approach.

Instead, ATC told him to expect the runway 32 approach.

The pilot responded that he had already set up for runway 5R but would change to runway 32.

That seemingly routine change became significant because the remainder of the flight demonstrated how difficult the pilot was having with the airplane's navigation equipment and the instrument environment.

Eleven minutes later, he contacted the tower.

Then the GPS problem appeared.

The GPS shuts off

At approximately 6:52 p.m., the pilot told the tower controller that he needed to climb because his GPS approach had shut off.

The controller instructed him to maintain 3,000 feet and asked him to confirm his heading.

The controller then asked whether he was in instrument conditions.

The pilot eventually confirmed that he was and said he was trying to climb above the clouds.

The controller instructed him to contact approach again.

More problems followed.

The pilot reported difficulty with his heading.

The controller asked him repeatedly to confirm it.

Eventually, the pilot requested a climb to get above the instrument conditions.

The controller cleared him to 4,000 feet.

The aircraft was still airborne.

But the workload was increasing.

Navigation became a struggle

The pilot was trying to enter fixes into the GPS and had difficulty with the procedure.

At one point he asked the controller for the phonetic spelling of a waypoint.

The controller later told him that he had missed the waypoint and issued a heading to take him toward another fix.

Later, the controller asked whether he had the next waypoint entered.

The sequence shows a pilot who was not simply flying an ordinary stabilized IFR approach.

He was actively struggling to operate the navigation system while simultaneously managing the aircraft and communicating with ATC.

The NTSB later reviewed the pilot's logbook.

The evidence showed that he had not maintained the recent instrument experience required to act as pilot-in-command carrying a passenger under the applicable rules. His most recent logged instrument experience was in November 2018, when he recorded three approaches. His most recent night experience was also in November 2018, when he logged only half an hour.

By October 2019, nearly a year had passed.

Back toward the runway

At about 7:11 p.m., ATC cleared the aircraft toward the approach fix and instructed the pilot to fly the straight-in approach to runway 32.

The pilot did not immediately acknowledge.

About a minute later, he was cleared for the RNAV GPS runway 32 approach.

This time he acknowledged.

The pilot responded that he was turning back toward it.

Then came a critical transmission.

He reported that he had “just broke out” of the clouds.

The controller asked whether he had the runway in sight.

The pilot did not immediately respond.

The controller cleared him for the visual approach.

The low-altitude warning

The controller increased the runway-light intensity.

The runway was ahead.

But the airplane was not where it needed to be vertically.

The controller issued a low-altitude alert and instructed the pilot to maintain 2,000 feet.

The pilot reported that he believed he could see the airport beacon.

The controller again asked whether he had the runway in sight.

At about 7:19 p.m., the runway lights were increased again.

The pilot reported that he thought he saw them.

The flight was transferred toward the tower.

Then another warning came.

The tower controller advised the pilot of a second low-altitude alert.

Radar contact was lost.

Into the darkness

A witness had landed on runway 32 shortly before the accident.

He later told investigators that he had heard some of the radio communications and believed the pilot sounded confused and was having difficulty with the approach.

The witness watched the airplane emerge beneath the clouds.

He reported that the airplane appeared stable.

Then it descended into the trees.

The area beneath the approach was heavily wooded and dark.

The airplane's wreckage was found the next morning in William B. Umstead State Park, about 1.18 miles southeast of the runway 32 threshold.

The first impact was with the top of a pine tree approximately 100 feet tall.

The wreckage path extended approximately 400 feet.

The evidence showed a shallow descent into the trees rather than a high-energy uncontrolled dive.

That was consistent with an airplane that remained under control but descended below a safe clearance altitude.

No mechanical explanation

Investigators examined the wreckage carefully.

Flight-control continuity was confirmed.

The fuel system showed no evidence of a failure that would explain the accident.

The vacuum system was examined and found functional.

There was no evidence of a mechanical anomaly that would have prevented normal operation.

The evidence therefore returned investigators to the approach itself.

The pilot was attempting to transition from instruments to visual flight at night.

The terrain below offered little visual contrast.

The NTSB's conclusion

The NTSB's probable-cause finding was:

“The pilot’s failure to maintain a safe glidepath during final approach to the runway, which resulted in a collision with trees and terrain.”

That conclusion is important because the flight had already contained numerous warning signs.

ATC had issued low-altitude warnings.

Accident Facts

The NTSB's air-traffic investigation reconstructed the flight using ATC communications and recorded flight-track information, providing a detailed picture of how the approach developed.

The safety lesson

The most striking feature of this accident is how many opportunities existed to interrupt the chain.

The pilot could have discontinued the approach when the GPS became unreliable.

He could have requested vectors.

He could have diverted.

He could have climbed and stabilized before attempting another approach.

ATC repeatedly assisted him and twice warned him about low altitude.

But once the pilot believed he had visual contact with the airport, the flight continued toward the runway.

The danger of a visual approach at night is that seeing lights does not necessarily mean knowing the aircraft's true position relative to terrain.

The runway may be visible while the ground immediately in front of the aircraft remains almost completely black.

That is exactly why stabilized approach criteria, instrument cross-checks and conservative go-around decisions matter.

This accident was not a story of one missed radio call.

It was the culmination of a pilot progressively losing the ability to manage the instrument environment, followed by an unsafe descent during the visual portion of the approach.

The final transmission—confirming that the runway was in sight—came only moments before radar and radio contact were lost.

The lesson is simple but fundamental: seeing the runway is not the same as being safely established on the approach to it.

Sources

• Original ATC recording