"Out OF FUEL & Both Engine Stopped" Beechcraft Crash

The Flight Reached the Runway With Almost Nothing Left

On September 8, 2023, Beech B200 N220KW was approaching Chicago O’Hare after a positioning flight when the pilot was told to go around. The airplane had already reached a critical fuel state. The pilot told controllers twice that he had minimum fuel available.

Accident Facts

The aircraft had begun the day after completing a charter flight. The pilot then flew to pick up passengers at another airport, but while approaching that destination he was told the previous passengers were ready to be collected. He did not land. Instead, he turned back toward the departure airport.

That decision extended the flight and consumed additional fuel. The pilot later noticed a high fuel burn and climbed first to 10,000 feet and then 16,000 feet. By the time he reached the O’Hare area, the fuel margin had become the central safety problem.

The NTSB found no pre-impact mechanical failure that prevented normal operation. The eventual dual-engine loss was the result of fuel exhaustion.

The Go-Around Became the Turning Point

The go-around was not itself the original cause of the emergency. It became critical because it occurred after the pilot had already recognized that fuel was at a minimum.

The NTSB's reconstruction makes the sequence unusually clear. The pilot was on about a three-mile final when the controller asked him to slow to final approach speed. Another airplane was still occupying the runway, so the controller instructed him to go around. The pilot had already told ATC twice that fuel was at a minimum.

At that point, the available choices were no longer equivalent. A go-around required additional fuel and additional flight time. Continuing another approach also required fuel. The pilot's earlier decision to remain airborne after the first destination opportunity had already reduced the margin available for an unexpected delay.

The investigation therefore treated the fuel state and the go-around decision together rather than describing the accident simply as an engine failure.

The Engines Did Not Fail Mechanically

The right engine lost power first, followed by the left. The pilot feathered both propellers and attempted a forced landing. The aircraft sustained substantial damage, while the pilot survived with serious injuries.

Postaccident evidence did not identify a mechanical malfunction that would have prevented normal operation. That finding matters because the radio recording could easily lead a listener to think of the event as a conventional twin-engine power failure.

It was not. The engines stopped because the airplane had exhausted its usable fuel. The NTSB concluded that the pilot's fuel planning and decision-making had allowed the fuel margin to disappear.

The pilot himself later described the situation as trying to do too much with too little fuel. That assessment is consistent with the investigative record.

What the Records Show

The NTSB determined that the probable cause was the pilot’s improper fuel planning, resulting in total loss of engine power from fuel exhaustion and the subsequent forced landing. The Board also identified the pilot’s decision to go around with minimum fuel as causal.

The finding does not mean that the controller's runway-occupancy instruction was itself unsafe. A controller must protect the runway and sequence traffic. The deeper safety problem was that the airplane had arrived at the runway with so little fuel that a normal operational interruption became an engine-out emergency.

Why This Incident Matters

Fuel planning has to account for what the flight may actually encounter, not only the most efficient version of the planned route. A passenger delay, a return leg, a high fuel burn, traffic and a go-around can each consume a small amount of margin. Together, they can remove the ability to absorb one more normal event.

N220KW demonstrates the danger of treating minimum fuel as a number that still permits normal decision-making. Once the pilot reported minimum fuel, the flight was already operating with very little room for another delay.

The most important lesson is therefore simple: fuel is an operational reserve, not a resource to spend until the engine stops.

Evidence and Findings

The operational history explains why the fuel state became so severe. The pilot had already completed one charter leg and then changed the mission when the next passengers became available. Instead of landing at the intermediate airport, he turned back. He later noticed higher-than-expected fuel burn and climbed to higher altitude. By the time he reached O'Hare, the airplane had very little reserve left.

The controller's go-around instruction was based on runway occupancy, not on the aircraft's fuel planning. That distinction matters. ATC cannot know every internal fuel calculation unless the pilot tells the controller. In this case, the pilot did communicate that fuel was minimum, but the airplane still attempted another approach. The investigation ultimately placed the causal weight on the pilot's fuel planning and the decision to go around with minimum fuel.

This is why the accident is more useful as a fuel-management case than as an engine-failure story. The engines stopped because the fuel supply was exhausted. The final forced landing was the physical consequence of a margin that had been consumed much earlier.

• Recalculate fuel whenever the mission changes or a flight is extended.
• Treat a minimum-fuel report as a serious reduction in available options.
• A go-around can become dangerous when the aircraft has already exhausted its fuel margin.
• Twin engines do not provide protection against fuel exhaustion.
• ATC runway instructions must be evaluated within the aircraft’s actual remaining fuel margin.

Sources

• Video source (ATC/audio reconstruction)