Engine Fire Leads to Fatal Crash in Las Vegas — 911 Call and ATC Audio

The Piper PA-31-350 had been airborne for only a few minutes when the emergency began.

It was August 28, 2008, and the aircraft had departed North Las Vegas Airport on what was supposed to be a ferry flight to Palo Alto, California. The airplane, registered N212HB, was carrying only one person: an airline transport pilot who had been hired to reposition the aircraft.

Then witnesses began seeing smoke coming from the right engine.

Within minutes, flames appeared.

But the airplane was losing altitude.

And the emergency response inside the cockpit would become just as important as the fire itself.

The 12-minute flight ended approximately 1.25 miles from the departure runway when N212HB struck trees and power lines before crashing upside down near a residential area. The pilot was fatally injured. A fuel-fed post-impact fire consumed the aircraft and damaged a nearby residence. (pilotdebrief.com)

A Ferry Flight With a Complicated Background

N212HB was a Piper PA-31-350 Navajo Chieftain.

The aircraft was being prepared for an eventual delivery to Korea, and it had undergone extensive maintenance and modification work.

That history became important to the investigation.

The airplane had recently received an annual inspection and major work on its engines, engine-driven fuel pumps, propellers and turbochargers. It had also been fitted with additional ferry fuel tanks.

Those additional tanks were connected to the aircraft's existing fuel system using custom-fabricated flexible fuel lines and fittings.

The modifications had not been approved by Piper.

The FAA had already declined to process a ferry-flight approval partly because of issues surrounding the modifications. The original ferry pilot was subsequently replaced, and the accident pilot was hired only two days before the crash. (pilotdebrief.com)

That meant the pilot was relatively unfamiliar with the specific aircraft and its unusual fuel configuration.

Investigators later found evidence that the unauthorized fuel-system modifications remained connected during the accident flight.

The significance would become clear after the crash.

Takeoff From North Las Vegas

N212HB departed Runway 7 at North Las Vegas at approximately 2:22 p.m.

The weather was visual.

There was no widespread weather emergency forcing the aircraft back toward the airport.

The airplane climbed westbound.

At approximately 2:27 p.m., it passed north of the airport at about 3,400 feet.

Two minutes later, it reached approximately 3,900 feet.

Then the flight path changed.

The aircraft began turning left toward the southwest.

Its altitude started falling.

The pilot was now moving farther from the airport while the airplane was losing altitude.

At approximately 2:31:29 p.m., the pilot declared an emergency with Las Vegas Approach and requested an immediate return to North Las Vegas. The aircraft was already descending through approximately 3,100 feet. (pilotdebrief.com)

The controller asked about the problem.

The pilot described an engine problem.

A few seconds later, he reported an engine failure and a rough engine.

ATC began helping him back toward the airport.

The Fire Becomes Visible

People on the ground could see what the controller could not.

One witness reported hearing several popping sounds before seeing black smoke coming from the right engine.

Another saw white smoke trailing from the engine.

Then orange flames appeared.

Witnesses described seeing what appeared to be a fireball around the right engine.

Some also heard several loud booming sounds as the aircraft descended. (pilotdebrief.com)

For the pilot, this was no longer simply an engine malfunction.

A fire in an engine nacelle is particularly dangerous because fuel lines, oil lines and electrical components are concentrated around a very hot powerplant.

If fuel continues feeding the fire, shutting down the engine may not be enough.

The fuel supply itself must be isolated.

The ATC Perspective

The ATC communications show the controller trying to create a path back to the airport.

The controller obtained the necessary information and coordinated with North Las Vegas Tower.

The pilot was told that he could land on Runway 7.

The controller also continued providing information and instructions while the airplane descended.

An FAA controller statement in the NTSB docket records that the pilot described the emergency as an engine failure and rough engine. The controller asked whether he could make the airport, and the pilot believed he could. (NTSB Data)

That is an important point.

The emergency was not initially communicated as an aircraft that was certain to crash.

From the controller's perspective, the job was therefore to keep the airplane moving toward the runway while emergency services were coordinated.

But the aircraft's performance was deteriorating.

What the Investigation Found

The NTSB examined both engines.

Neither showed evidence of an internal mechanical failure that would have prevented normal operation.

That finding was important.

The right engine had not simply exploded because an internal component failed.

Instead, the evidence pointed toward an in-flight fuel-fed fire in the right engine compartment. (pilotdebrief.com)

Investigators found significantly greater fire damage around the right engine-driven fuel pump and fuel supply line.

The fuel pump housing had lost material around the outlet port.

Localized areas showed evidence of intense heating.

The actual fuel line and associated fittings had been destroyed by the fire, preventing investigators from determining exactly which component had initiated the leak.

The NTSB therefore could not establish a single definitive physical point of failure.

But the evidence strongly suggested that fuel had escaped inside the hot engine compartment.

The Pilot's Emergency Configuration

This is where the accident became more than an engine-fire story.

The Piper's emergency procedures contained a specific sequence for an engine fire.

The affected engine's firewall fuel shutoff valve needed to be closed.

The propeller needed to be feathered.

The cowl flaps needed to be closed.

The magnetos and fuel pumps needed to be secured.

The airplane also needed to be flown at an appropriate single-engine airspeed and configured to minimize drag.

The accident pilot did feather the right propeller.

But investigators found that other parts of the fire procedure had not been completed.

The right engine's firewall shutoff remained open.

The cowl flaps remained open.

The magnetos remained on.

And the landing gear was extended prematurely. (pilotdebrief.com)

Each of those decisions affected the airplane's ability to maintain altitude.

A twin-engine aircraft does not automatically have the performance needed to climb after losing an engine.

Single-engine performance depends on configuration, weight, temperature, altitude and airspeed.

Drag becomes critical.

If the airplane is flying below its best single-engine speed while also carrying additional drag from landing gear and improperly configured cowl flaps, the remaining engine may not be able to produce enough excess power.

The Speed Problem

The PA-31-350's performance data indicated that, under appropriate conditions and configuration, it could maintain or climb on one engine.

But the accident aircraft was not operating in that optimum configuration.

Radar data showed the airplane flying about 16 knots slower than the published single-engine speed associated with maximum performance. (pilotdebrief.com)

That difference may sound small.

Aerodynamically, it was not.

Below the optimum single-engine speed, drag increases and climb performance deteriorates.

This is why emergency procedures are designed to be followed from memory.

Under stress, the pilot does not have the luxury of inventing a solution.

The checklist exists to protect against exactly this kind of cognitive overload.

The Final Approach

The pilot was trying to reach Runway 7.

But the airplane was descending continuously.

The fire remained visible.

The remaining engine was apparently still producing power, but the airplane was not maintaining altitude.

The flight had begun with nearly 4,000 feet of altitude.

Now it was only a few hundred feet above the ground.

But "almost there" is not the same as "safe."

At approximately 2:34 p.m., the aircraft crossed the final portion of its approach.

It did not reach the runway.

Instead, it struck trees at an estimated 50–75 feet above ground.

The aircraft then hit power lines.

The right wingtip separated.

The main wreckage came to rest inverted between residential properties.

A person on the ground suffered minor injuries, while four other people at the impacted residence escaped without injury.

NTSB Probable Cause

“A loss of power in the right engine due to an in-flight fuel-fed fire in the right engine compartment that, while the exact origin could not be determined, was likely related to the right engine-driven fuel pump, its fuel supply line, or fitting.”

The Board also identified as a contributing factor the pilot's failure to follow the POH fire-response procedures and configure the airplane to reduce aerodynamic drag. (pilotdebrief.com)

That conclusion is significant because it does not blame the pilot for starting the fire.

The investigation instead examined why the airplane could not make the relatively short return to the airport.

The answer involved both the aircraft's configuration and the pilot's emergency response.

Accident Facts

The FAA controller statement and NTSB docket provide the ATC chronology, while independent accident reporting and the NTSB findings establish the aircraft's mechanical and operational sequence. (NTSB Data)

The Broader Safety Lesson

The Las Vegas accident demonstrates how an emergency can become more dangerous when a pilot does not fully configure the airplane according to its emergency checklist.

But the aircraft was a twin-engine airplane returning to the airport.

That meant there was initially a survivable path.

He had a functioning engine.

He had ATC assistance.

He knew the airport was nearby.

The available margin was gradually consumed by drag, speed, fire and altitude loss.

The most important lesson is not simply "memorize the engine-fire checklist."

It is to understand why each action exists.

Shutting off the fuel stops the fire's supply.

Feathering the propeller reduces drag.

Closing the cowl flaps reduces drag.

Maintaining the correct single-engine airspeed protects performance.

Keeping the landing gear retracted prevents unnecessary drag until landing is assured.

Those actions are not administrative details.

They are what allow the remaining engine to convert power into altitude or, at minimum, reduce the rate of descent.

The pilot had made the correct high-level decision to turn back.

But in an emergency, the route to the airport is only one part of the problem. The aircraft must also be configured to survive the route.

Sources

• Original ATC recording