Sky Lease Cargo 747 Overran Halifax Runway 14

The runway choice narrowed before landing

Sky Lease Cargo Boeing 747-412F N908AR was operating flight KYE4854 from Chicago O'Hare to Halifax/Stanfield International Airport on 7 November 2018. The aircraft carried three crew members and one passenger. The crew conducted an ILS approach to Runway 14 at night.

A tailwind appeared late in the approach

The crew became aware of a tailwind about one minute and 21 seconds before the threshold. They did not recalculate the landing performance to confirm that the available distance remained acceptable. The investigation found that the way NOTAM information was presented had led the crew to believe the longer Runway 23 was unavailable.

The aircraft did not stop

The 747 touched down on the wet runway and continued beyond the runway end. It went down a slope and through the localizer antenna before stopping about 200 metres beyond the runway end. The aircraft sustained damage severe enough to become a hull loss. The four occupants survived, with minor injuries reported.

Fatigue and performance calculations compounded the problem

The TSB identified several contributing factors: the crew's sleep-related fatigue, use of unfactored landing-distance information, an approach-speed calculation using a larger wind additive than recommended, the late recognition of the tailwind and inadequate deceleration performance. The investigation also identified a momentary thrust-lever mishandling and a lateral deviation that diverted attention from braking.

The runway was not the only issue

The investigation did not reduce the event to a single mistake. Information presentation, runway availability assumptions, performance calculation, fatigue, wind, speed and aircraft handling interacted during the approach and landing. That combination explains why a large aircraft that had completed an otherwise routine instrument approach could still leave the runway with substantial energy remaining.

The TSB's findings show why the runway overrun cannot be reduced to tailwind alone. The crew had information that Runway 23 was not available, even though the runway was the longer and more suitable option. The crew also did not meet the pre-departure landing-weight requirement for Runway 14 with the selected flap setting, used unfactored landing-distance data and calculated a higher-than-recommended wind additive. Sleep-related fatigue further degraded performance. During the landing roll, attention was also diverted by a lateral deviation and thrust-lever handling, while braking proved insufficient to stop the aircraft before the runway end. The result was a chain of interacting factors rather than a single calculation error.

The TSB also noted that the aircraft stopped beyond the runway after passing through the localizer antenna area. The runway environment therefore became part of the damage sequence, not merely a location. The four occupants survived, but the aircraft was sufficiently damaged to become a hull loss. This outcome is important when describing the event as an accident rather than a routine runway excursion.

The TSB report states: “The unexpected tailwind resulted in a greater landing distance required, but this distance did not exceed the length of the runway.”

Accident Facts

Sources

• Transportation Safety Board of Canada final investigation A18A0085: https://www.bst.gc.ca/eng/enquetes-investigations/aviation/2018/a18a0085/a18a0085.html
• Transportation Safety Board of Canada, investigation A18A0085: https://www.bst.gc.ca/eng/enquetes-investigations/aviation/2018/a18a0085/a18a0085.html
• TSB final report: https://bst.gc.ca/eng/rapports-reports/aviation/2018/a18a0085/a18a0085.html
• SKYbrary summary: https://skybrary.aero/bookshelf/final-report-b744-n908ar-halifax-ns-canada-7-november-2018