"Hazard" student pilot’s crash landing forces another student pilot to (almost) divert

A Routine First Solo Ended on the Grass

On March 2, 2017, student pilot N6138Q was conducting a first solo flight at Tulsa. The Cessna 152 was scheduled for three landings.

Accident Facts

The second landing did not go normally. The airplane porpoised, with the nosewheel contacting the runway first. The student added power and performed a go-around.

The third landing initially looked better. The touchdown was soft and occurred on the main landing gear. But when the nosewheel came down, the aircraft veered right, left the runway and nosed over in the grass.

The student was not injured, but the airplane sustained substantial damage to the empennage.

The Go-Around Was the Right Response to the First Bad Landing

The second landing is important because it shows the student recognized that the airplane was not in a stable landing condition. Rather than trying to salvage the porpoising touchdown, the student added power and went around.

The third landing produced a different problem. The touchdown itself was described as soft and on the main gear, but the airplane subsequently lost directional control when the nosewheel contacted the runway.

The NTSB found no preaccident mechanical malfunction that would have prevented normal operation. The investigation therefore centered on pilot control rather than the aircraft's steering or landing-gear condition.

The Accident Was About Directional Control, Not the Earlier Porpoise

It would be easy to treat the porpoise as the cause of the accident because it happened immediately before the final landing. The NTSB did not do that.

The probable cause was the student's loss of directional control. The earlier go-around was a separate decision that successfully prevented a worse second-landing outcome.

That distinction matters for training. A go-around is not a failure. It is a control action that preserves the option to try again. The lesson is to carry that same discipline into the next approach and remain prepared to go around again if the landing becomes unstable.

Why This Incident Matters

First solo flights are deliberately designed to expose students to normal operating tasks with an instructor no longer sitting beside them. Small deviations in landing technique can therefore become significant because the student has less experience recognizing and correcting them.

N6138Q demonstrates both sides of that training environment. The student correctly rejected the second landing with a go-around, then lost directional control on the third attempt.

A good training lesson is not that the first solo was inappropriate. It is that every landing remains a fresh control problem, and a go-around remains available whenever the aircraft is no longer aligned or stabilized.

Evidence and Findings

The instructor was observing from the airport. That means the event was not an uncontrolled solo flight without any supervisory presence; the instructor could observe the landing and provide a factual account to investigators afterward.

The postaccident examination found no mechanical malfunction that would have prevented normal operation. The empennage was substantially damaged after the aircraft left the runway and nosed over.

The causal distinction matters for training. The first unstable landing did not directly cause the accident because the student successfully discontinued it. The final loss of directional control was the event that produced the crash.

This is a useful case for emphasizing the difference between a bad landing and a bad decision. The student made the correct decision to go around once. The remaining lesson is that the next landing still requires the same disciplined directional control and willingness to abandon the approach if alignment or control is lost.

What Could Have Broken the Chain

The second landing already demonstrated that the student was experiencing difficulty with the landing technique. The go-around broke that chain once. A second go-around would have been another available barrier if directional control became uncertain on the third landing.

The instructor's presence on the ground also provided a monitoring layer. The instructor could observe the student's technique and later supplied investigators with a detailed account of both landings.

The final accident still developed because the aircraft departed the runway after nosewheel contact. That makes directional control the central training lesson. A student who has just completed a difficult landing should be prepared to discontinue another attempt rather than feel committed to completing the pattern.

The event is therefore less about a single mistake and more about preserving the option to go around repeatedly until the landing is stable.

• A go-around is a successful safety decision, not a failure.
• Directional control must remain active through nosewheel touchdown and rollout.
• A previous unstable landing should increase caution on the next approach.
• Student pilots should be encouraged to abandon a landing rather than force it.
• Mechanical causes should not be assumed when the investigation identifies pilot control as the cause.

Sources

• Video source (ATC/audio reconstruction)